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This report 
 
This report has been commissioned by the Labour Party from a group of independent 
academics to assist in policy development.  The authors are solely responsible for the views 
expressed in the report, which do not necessarily reflect the views of the Party and should 
not be read as a statement of Party policy. 
 
The report draws on the authors’ substantial and wide-ranging expertise, accumulated over 
several decades, on urban and regional economic development in the UK and elsewhere.  It 
also draws on the authors many years’ experience working with local authorities and other 
partners in promoting jobs, growth and access to opportunities for disadvantaged groups 
and communities. 
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Foreword  
For some the term ‘industrial strategy’ strikes up a vision of days gone by, of factories, 
chimneys and hard hats, of protectionism and ‘picking winners’ but it has become increasingly 
realised that a 21st century industrial strategy will be key to addressing the economic 
challenges facing 21st century Britain. 
The structure of the UK economy has changed significantly over recent decades. For the most 
part policy-makers have assumed that the best way to secure a successful economy is to 
leave the market to its own devices. This neoliberal consensus has dictated economic policy 
for much of the past forty years. While it is beyond dispute that this approach helped lead to 
periods of growth, it has also allowed long term social and economic problems to accumulate.  
In the UK the top 1% own 24%[1] of wealth, the top 5th of earners receive forty percent of 
income and an average employee would have to work 160 years to earn a FTSE 100 boss's 
yearly pay[2]. According to the Trade Union Congress nearly four million people face insecurity 
at work[3] and court cases against Uber and Deliveroo have shown that a growing gig economy 
left to its own devices will only breed new kinds of exploitative working practices.  
Similarly the long term decline in the UK’s manufacturing base alongside our over reliance on 
the financial sector has allowed the talents and resources of large swaths of the country to go 
to waste. In the early 1980s 26% of jobs were in manufacturing compared to only 8.1% now 
and manufacturing now accounts for only 10% of our Gross Value Added. As a result, post-
industrial Northern and coastal towns have seen their communities decimated. 
The UK is now the most regionally unequal country in the European Union. We are home to 
the richest region in Northern Europe, London, but we also have six of the ten poorest. Leaving 
the European Union risks exacerbating these inequalities. As this report highlights European 
Structural Funds have been integral to the success of our regions; between 2014 and 2020 
the UK will receive £9 billion with Wales benefitting from over £2 billion due to its ‘less 
developed’ status. 
It is clear that now is the time, as we leave the EU and the failure of the free-market experiment 
is laid bare, for a radical and responsible industrial strategy which will transform the economy 
and create the good jobs of the future. This report will help develop Labour’s industrial strategy 
and ensure prosperity in every region of the UK. 
 
 
Rebecca Long Bailey MP 
Shadow Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy  
                                                          
[1] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/britain-richest-people-own-uk-wealth-inequality-
credit-suisse-oxfam-a7432076.html  
[2] https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/strategy/reward/executive-pay-ftse-
100?utm_medium=vanity&utm_source=various&utm_content=execpay&utm_campaign=res_misc  
[3] https://www.tuc.org.uk/workplace-issues/employment-rights/gig-trade-unions-tackling-insecure-work  
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Recommendations 
 
 
 
National Investment Bank 
 
• Allocate proportionately more of the funding available to the National 
Investment Bank to support the UK’s less prosperous local economies 
 
• Concentrate the Bank’s lending on businesses that sell to outside the local 
area, and especially those that export from the UK, to help minimise the 
displacement of activity from other local businesses 
 
National Transformation Fund 
 
• Use the National Transformation Fund to support a range of local projects that 
promote regional and local development 
 
• Integrate the relevant parts of the National Productivity Investment Fund, the 
Transforming Cities Fund and the Local Growth Fund into the new National 
Transformation Fund 
 
• Revise the Treasury’s assessment criteria for transport projects to give more 
weight to regional and local economic development 
 
A successor to the EU Structural Funds 
 
• Implement a replacement for the EU Structural Funds but be prepared to 
modify the details inherited from the Conservatives – and perhaps re-brand the 
revised Fund to give it a new identity 
 
• Commit to a replacement for the EU Structural Funds worth at least £1.5bn a 
year, which allowing for inflation would match the funding presently coming 
from the EU 
 
• Manage the replacement funding to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
outside the Barnett formula, in the same way as EU funds are managed at 
present 
 
• Operate the replacement for the EU funds on the basis of multiannual financial 
allocations in order to create certainty, foster stability and allow the proper 
planning of ambitious longer-term projects 
 
• Deliver a replacement for the EU funds that provides more efficient, more 
flexible support, with greater opportunity to tailor local spending to local 
priorities within the framework of national and local plans 
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• Allocate the new Fund between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
on the same basis as the present-day division of EU funding – the recent shifts 
in relative prosperity do not for the moment justify a change 
 
• Deploy the funding within England to target less prosperous regions and local 
economies, using local data and transparent allocation criteria 
 
State Aid rules 
 
• Commit to making greater use of the EU State Aid rules, so long as they apply, 
to deliver support for a wide range of activity to support businesses, especially 
in less prosperous areas 
 
• Exploit any post-Brexit flexibility to set UK State Aid rules that are better 
aligned to an active Industrial Strategy and to the promotion of a better balance 
of growth and jobs across the country 
 
Assisted Area map 
 
• Welcome the opportunity that an Assisted Area map provides to target 
investment support at firms in less prosperous parts of the country 
 
• Re-introduce a budget line in England to provide financial support for 
investment by firms in the Assisted Areas 
 
Enterprise Zones 
 
• Replace the present Enterprise Zones with a smaller number of ‘Business 
Investment Zones’ with an enhanced package of incentives 
 
Business rates 
 
• Avoid being seduced into thinking that lowering business rates can be an 
important tool of economic development 
 
Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 
 
• Deliver support for R&D to a wider range of sectors in a wider range of 
locations across the country 
 
• Move away from predominantly supporting research to a greater emphasis on 
product development, dissemination, good practice and the commercialisation 
of ideas  
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Skills 
 
• Supplement national support for training and skills by earmarking a substantial 
proportion of the replacement for the EU Structural Funds for skills 
development in less prosperous local economies 
 
• Review the Apprenticeship Levy, particularly with reference to its role in skills 
development across regions and local areas 
 
Public procurement 
 
• Use public procurement as a tool to support British industry and promote jobs 
and training in the regions 
 
Public sector jobs 
 
• Initiate a review of the scope for public sector employment to better contribute 
to reducing economic disparities, whether through decentralisation or 
devolution. 
 
Energy-intensive industries 
 
• Sustain the international competitiveness of the UK’s energy-intensive 
industries by lowering their electricity bills whilst maintaining interventions to 
deliver a low carbon future 
 
Trade defence instruments 
 
• Welcome free trade but ensure that outside the EU the UK is, if necessary, able 
to deploy a full set of trade defence instruments to combat unfair competition 
 
Central government 
 
• Retain ultimate, central government responsibility for promoting prosperity in 
all parts of the UK and for narrowing the gaps across the country 
 
• Establish a high-level Council for Regional Development to oversee and 
coordinate programmes and policies 
 
The devolved administrations 
 
• Welcome the important and independent role that the devolved administrations 
play in regional and local development, and ensure that supportive policies are 
in place at the UK level  
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Local Enterprise Partnerships 
 
• Retain Local Enterprise Partnerships but be prepared to modify their 
structures and raise their effectiveness 
 
• Make LEPs more clearly and directly accountable to the local authorities within 
their areas, including combined authorities in the places where these have 
been established 
 
• Engage a range of social partners on LEP boards to improve accountability 
and bring to bear their expertise 
 
Devolution in England 
 
• Discontinue the current deal-based approach to devolution to English local 
authorities in favour of more straightforward centre-local funding models 
based on the assessment of need 
 
Regions 
 
• Re-establish government offices in the English regions to help co-ordinate the 
work of the LEPs and strengthen central-local relations 
 
• Replace the present Northern Powerhouse and Midlands Engine with cross-
boundary frameworks for collaboration between central and local government 
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1. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Britain is a profoundly unequal society, divided by class, gender and race.  But it is also a 
country divided by geography.  People’s life chances vary enormously according to where 
they happen to live.  In some places life can be comfortable; in others it is a seemingly 
unending struggle to get by. 
 
Many of the differences across the country are rooted in the strength of the local economy.  
Over the years, the changing structure of the UK economy has concentrated businesses and 
jobs in some parts of the country but destroyed the economic base of others.  Some of the 
changes were always going to be hard to avoid but a large part reflects failure and 
mismanagement.  In particular, the erosion of Britain’s industrial base, which has gone 
further and faster than in just about any other country, has destroyed the economic 
foundations of many communities, leaving them struggling to find a new role in the world.  
This has fuelled feelings of political alienation and, many would argue, lies behind the 
support for Brexit in so many disadvantaged communities. 
 
This report looks at what a Labour government needs to do to heal the economic divides 
across the country.  It takes as its starting point the aspirations and commitments in Labour’s 
2017 general election manifesto, which did so much to galvanise support for a radical rethink 
of the way Britain is heading, but sets out to fill in some of the important gaps on regional 
and local economic development.  The report has been commissioned by the Labour 
leadership but it is the independent work of a group of academics drawing on experience, 
knowledge and many years of research on Britain’s urban and regional problems. 
 
Section 2 of the report provides a short overview of the disparities across the country that so 
disfigure contemporary Britain.  The ‘North-South divide’ is familiar to most people but as we 
explain, the divisions are more complex.  Section 3 looks at the tools a Labour government 
could deploy to help spread growth and prosperity across the country.  ‘Regional policy’ 
would be the conventional term for what we talk about here but the focus is on interventions 
at several levels, not just regions.  Section 4 considers the institutional structures that a 
Labour government needs to put in place to deliver these interventions, across the UK as a 
whole and in England in particular, where the present arrangements are a mess. 
 
A Labour government will not start with a blank sheet of paper.  Rather, it will inherit an array 
of policies and programmes from its Conservative predecessor.  Some of these are best 
discarded, others modified.  The proposals set out here are, we think, a good starting point. 
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2. BRITAIN’S REGIONAL PROBLEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Britain’s regional problem has long been characterised as a ‘North-South divide’ dating back 
at least to the 1920s.  There is real substance to this view, especially in the long decline of 
the industries that once underpinned so many communities in the North, Scotland and 
Wales.  However, the contemporary regional problem is more complex. 
 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
Conservative ministers like to believe that during the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis 
Britain’s unemployment problem has largely been solved.  What is true is that the national 
headline total is down on levels during the recession, and down on the levels of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, and the official figures point to a narrowing of the differences across the 
country1.  Employment is also up, though so too is the size of the UK workforce.  Even so, at 
almost 1.4 million on the government’s preferred measure2 unemployment has certainly not 
disappeared. 
 
This is particularly the case in the less prosperous parts of the country.  Whereas in local 
authority districts across much of southern England the official unemployment rate is now 
below 4 per cent, and in some places as low as 2 per cent, in other parts of the country the 
rate is much higher – often between 5 and 8 per cent and higher still in the worst affected 
local authorities (see Figure 1 in the appendix). 
 
But the official figures provide only a partial view.  One of the long-term consequences of job 
destruction in so many areas is that men and women with health problems or disabilities 
have been pushed out of the labour market and parked on incapacity benefits3.  The number 
of working-age claimants on incapacity benefits rose from around 750,000 at the end of the 
1970s to 2.5 million at the start of the 2000s and has barely fallen since, despite the best 
efforts of successive governments.  There are presently three times as many men and 
                                                          
1 This is a regular feature of recovery from recession, the reason being that in the places where 
unemployment started quite low it is hard to bring down the figure much further. 
2 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of unemployment, which counts those 
available for work and looking for work and is wider than the ‘claimant count’ (those claiming 
unemployment benefits) which currently stands at around 700,000. 
3 These days Employment and Support Allowance or, as the changeover takes place, Universal Credit 
on the grounds of sickness or disability. 
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women of working age out-of-work on incapacity benefits as on unemployment benefits and 
just about all of them are excluded from the government’s wider measures of unemployment. 
 
The men and women on incapacity benefits are disproportionately concentrated in Britain’s 
weaker local economies, where they can sometimes account for 10 per cent of all adults of 
working age.  In these places, where employers can be choosy about who they take on, ill 
health or disability can be a key factor in determining who finds and keeps employment.  The 
health problems are real and the benefit claims therefore legitimate, but comparisons with 
the most prosperous parts of the country, where the incapacity claimant rate is far lower, 
suggest that a significant proportion of claimants would have been in work in a genuinely 
fully employed economy.  In effect, in weaker local economies much of the unemployment 
has become hidden, and so too has the scale of the labour market divide across the country. 
 
Successive reports from Sheffield Hallam University have adjusted for this distortion to local 
unemployment figures.  In assessing the scale of ‘hidden unemployment’ on incapacity 
benefits, the Sheffield Hallam figures take account of not only what has been shown to be 
possible in the parts of the country where there is effectively full employment but also the 
underlying differences in health between different parts of the country.  The most recent 
figures, for 20174, confirm that unemployment is down since the recession but still point to a 
real level of unemployment of around 2.3 million.  This includes 750,000 of the nearly 2.5 
million adults of working age out of the labour market on incapacity benefits.  The Sheffield 
Hallam figures provide an alternative set of unemployment figures for every district in Britain 
and expose the extent to which hidden unemployment is concentrated in places where 
official unemployment rates are already highest (Figure 2 in the appendix). 
 
Whereas at one time the hidden unemployment on incapacity benefits was dominated by ex-
miners. ex-steelworkers and other redundant workers from heavy industry, these have 
mostly passed out of the figures into retirement.  These days it is the generation behind 
them, in much the same places, that make up the big numbers and they include almost as 
many women as men5. 
 
High unemployment remains a defining feature of the older industrial areas of northern and 
western Britain.  Places such as the Welsh Valleys, the Glasgow area, Merseyside and the 
industrial North East stand out.  The ‘real rate of unemployment’ here typically remains in 
excess of 8 per cent and in some cases above 10 per cent of the entire working age 
population. 
 
Britain’s older industrial areas are joined by a number of coastal districts – places such as 
Blackpool, Great Yarmouth, Thanet, Hastings and Torbay – and some inner urban areas.  
Parts of London have high unemployment, though not as high as older industrial Britain, but 
London’s unemployment tends to be concentrated in particular boroughs where it reflects 
residential segregation between the richer and poorer areas of the city. 
 
                                                          
4 C Beatty, S Fothergill and T Gore (2017) The Real Level of Unemployment 2017, CRESR, Sheffield 
Hallam University.  See also C Beatty and S Fothergill (2005) ‘The diversion from ‘unemployment’ to 
‘sickness’ across British regions and districts’, Regional Studies, vol. 39, pp. 837-854. 
5 C Beatty, S Fothergill, D Houston, R Powell and P Sissons (2009) Women on Incapacity Benefits, 
CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University and Dept. of Geography, University of Dundee. 
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On the other hand, even on the ‘real unemployment’ measure there is little to suggest that 
unemployment is more than a marginal issue in large parts of southern and eastern England 
outside London.  Some parts of northern England, such as rural North Yorkshire, also fall 
into this category. 
 
In summary, the long-standing divides in unemployment across the country are as prominent 
as ever. 
 
 
 
Output 
 
 
It is generally best to look at differences in economic output at the sub-regional scale so that 
the concentrations of businesses in city centres and on business parks (and the associated 
commuting flows) don’t distort the picture.  The sub-regional pattern of output per head 
(Table 1 in the appendix) is in several respects the converse of the pattern of 
unemployment, with prosperous areas in southern England mostly leading the way, but the 
differences between the highest and lowest areas are strikingly large. 
 
London has an output per head that is nearly 170 per cent of the UK average.  The Thames 
Valley Berkshire LEP6 area comes in at 150 per cent, and the Aberdeen area in Scotland, 
the home of the North Sea oil industry, at 135 per cent.  By contrast, the Black Country LEP 
area in the West Midlands reaches only 66 per cent of the UK average.  South West Wales, 
which includes large parts of the Valleys, also reaches only 66 per cent of the UK average. 
 
To put these figures another way, the output per head in the most productive parts of the UK 
is between two and three times higher than in the least productive areas.  This does not 
mean, of course, that workers in some parts of the country are lazier than in others.  Rather, 
it reflects the number and type of jobs in each area. 
 
There is little evidence of convergence.  Between 2010 and 2016 the UK economy grew by 
around 12 per cent in real terms, finally making good the losses during the recession and 
then advancing a little.  In London the growth in output was 20 per cent, and all the English 
sub-regions that started with a GVA per head above the UK average grew by more than 10 
per cent.  By contrast, output in Tees Valley and in the Liverpool City Region grew by only 1 
per cent. 
 
Over the same 2010-16 period, London topped the league in terms of the growth in 
employment (up 18 per cent), followed by Hertfordshire (up 17 per cent) and the South East 
Midlands (up nearly 15 per cent).  At the other end of the spectrum, employment fell in Tees 
Valley and the Black Country, though thankfully not by much. 
 
  
                                                          
6 Local Enterprise Partnership 
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Job quality 
 
 
It isn’t just that there are fewer jobs in the less prosperous parts of the country and that 
output per head is less.  The quality of the jobs is poorer. 
 
One of the indicators is the share of employment in managerial and professional occupations 
(Figure 3 in the appendix).  London and parts of southern England have a concentration of 
this type of employment – often it accounts for more than 35 per cent of all jobs.  Edinburgh 
matches these levels, but elsewhere the proportion of managerial and professional jobs is 
lower.  The pattern is not a simple North-South divide, nor one of older industrial areas 
versus the rest.  The places with the very lowest proportion of these higher-grade jobs are 
mostly rural though there are also several rural areas that do not conform to this general 
pattern. 
 
Low pay is another indicator of job quality and one that has attracted increasing attention as 
the UK economy has moved out of recession.  Unlike in previous recoveries, real wages 
have stagnated and so too has UK productivity.  The replacement for too many of the good 
jobs that have disappeared has been low-paid insecure work, some of it on zero-hours 
contracts.  Even ‘self-employment’ has too often become a mechanism for unscrupulous 
employers to duck their responsibilities7. 
 
It is hard to get a reliable local or regional picture of this rising insecurity but the TUC8 has 
documented some of the disturbing national consequences: 
 
• On average, the self-employed presently earn only 60 per cent of the median annual 
earnings – down from 70 per cent ten years ago 
 
• For those on zero hours contracts, median hourly pay is only two-thirds of that for all 
employees 
 
• Median hourly pay for agency staff is worth just 80 per cent of the employee average 
 
• Median hourly pay for casual and seasonal work is just 60 per cent of the employee 
average 
 
The TUC analysis shows that low paid employment is found mainly in construction, 
administration, transport and storage, wholesale and the retail trade.  Zero hours contracts 
are most likely to be found in accommodation and food, health and social work. Those 
employed on temporary basis are often found in education, health and social work, 
accommodation and food, wholesale, retail and manufacturing. 
 
The distribution of median earnings across the country (Figure 4) shows a clustering of the 
highest earnings in districts in and around London.  In fact, the vast majority of Britain away 
                                                          
7 See M Taylor (2017) Good Work: the Taylor review of modern working practices, BEIS, London. 
8 TUC (2016) Living on the Edge: the rise of job insecurity in modern Britain, TUC, London. 
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from this corner of the country has average earnings below the national average.  The very 
lowest earnings are in a number of remoter rural areas, including Cornwall and West Wales, 
in a number of seaside towns, and in some older industrial areas beyond the big cities.  This 
is a pattern that has long persisted.  It is difficult to track the recent changes at the district-
level9 but the long-term trend has been for the UK regions to grow further apart. 
 
Low pay is particularly widespread in occupations that require few formal qualifications.  
According to the Resolution Foundation10, those earning less than the Living Wage include 
62 per cent in ‘elementary occupations’, 59 per cent in ‘sales and customer service’ and 40 
per cent in ‘caring’. 
 
 
 
Industry 
 
 
Manufacturing occupies an important place in regional and local economies because it 
mostly brings in new money to an area which then recirculates, via supply chains and 
employees’ spending, to support other jobs in the local economy.  Manufacturing is not 
unique in this respect because other activities that serve markets beyond the immediate 
locality – tourism, universities, call centres, warehousing, national and international banking 
and much more – also drive local economies in this way.  But manufacturing remains a large 
part of the ‘economic base’ of many areas. 
 
Manufacturing is also important because over many decades it has offered scope via 
mechanisation for delivering the increases in productivity that help underpin rising living 
standards.  Some sectors of manufacturing also provide higher-wage employment. 
 
The industrial job losses that have scarred the UK economy so badly have been 
concentrated in specific parts of the country.  Indeed, the root cause of the unemployment 
and low pay in so many cities, towns and communities in the North, the Midlands, Scotland 
and Wales can be traced back to this job destruction.  They have lost the mines, factories 
and docks that once underpinned their whole economies and it has been an uphill struggle 
to build a new economic base.  London and most of the South, by contrast, escaped more 
lightly and have been the favoured location for growing sectors such as financial services. 
 
Yet despite all the industrial job losses, manufacturing remains concentrated in many of its 
traditional locations (Figure 5).  The biggest single cluster of manufacturing jobs is in 
Birmingham but there are also substantial numbers in South and West Yorkshire, in the 
North East and North West, on Humberside, in South Wales and in Central Scotland. 
 
Manufacturing industries vary in both scale and location.  To illustrate this point, Figures 6-
11 in the appendix show the location of jobs in six specific sectors – food & drink production, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, steel, the motor industry and aerospace.  Whereas the food & 
                                                          
9 Local data from the government’s Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) is affected by 
sampling error which makes comparisons over time problematic. 
10 Resolution Foundation (2016) Low Pay Britain 2016, Resolution Foundation, London 
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drink industry is a large employer and widely dispersed across the country, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and steel employ smaller numbers and in fewer locations.  The motor and 
aerospace industries are also concentrated in a handful of locations but in several of these 
the number of jobs is large.  In the motor industry, for example, there are major clusters in 
the West Midlands, the North West and North East.  In aerospace, Rolls Royce in Derby, 
Airbus in North Wales and Bristol, and BAE Systems in Lancashire are especially prominent. 
 
The supply chains of each of these industries will of course extend widely, including to 
smaller local firms but also across the rest of the country and, particularly in the motor and 
aerospace industries, into component suppliers elsewhere in the EU.  Several of the big UK 
plants are themselves suppliers of major components (e.g. engines, wings) for final 
assembly in the EU. 
 
By contrast to the location of manufacturing production, the location of research and 
development establishments (Figure 12)11 shows a very different geography with 
Cambridge, Oxford and a swathe of places in and around London dominating the picture. 
 
What the location of manufacturing underlines is that a successful industrial strategy should 
be a win-win strategy: 
 
• A resurgence of manufacturing industry is what the UK economy needs to move 
away from an over-dependence on financial services, to reduce the trade deficit by 
selling more to the rest of the world, to end the UK’s debt-driven model of economic 
growth and to lay the foundations for rising living standards. 
 
• A resurgence of manufacturing would also be of direct benefit to many of the places 
in the Midlands, North, Scotland and Wales where the need for more and better jobs 
is greatest. 
 
It is already evident that UK industry, and in particular manufacturing, will undergo 
considerable change in the next decade or so as robotics, artificial intelligence and machine 
learning technologies become pervasive.  Whilst these developments are forecast to 
increase GDP they are also technologies that are likely to lead to further job losses, 
including in many already disadvantaged parts of the UK.  Regional and local development 
policies need to respond to these challenges. 
 
Successful policies for industry and jobs in the regions can help UK businesses compete in 
world markets.  In part this is about addressing poor productivity but it is also about 
competing on quality and design.  Different sectors will contribute towards these goals in 
different ways, depending on their strengths and capabilities, and the re-shoring of 
production from abroad may become increasingly viable as wage costs rise in China and 
elsewhere. 
 
Successful policies for industry and jobs can also improve the quality of life and well-being of 
millions of people in places across the UK that in recent decades have too often been left 
behind.  
                                                          
11 Excludes universities and R&D on production sites 
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3. TOOLS FOR LOCAL AND REGIONAL GROWTH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delivering growth and jobs in less prosperous parts of the country requires action across a 
broad front.  There has never been a single ‘silver bullet’ that will deliver local and regional 
economic development; rather, the UK’s long experience demonstrates that success 
requires a toolkit of policies targeting different elements of the overall jigsaw.  It is the 
combined effect of several interventions, working together in tandem, that nearly always 
produces the best results. 
 
In simple terms, local and regional economic development requires infrastructure – good 
transport connections, sites and premises, utilities and broadband.  It requires business 
investment and enterprise, encouraged where necessary by public financial support.  It 
requires a skilled workforce to take advantage of emerging opportunities.  And it requires a 
supportive business environment.  None of these in isolation is enough and, frankly, under 
the present Conservative government elements of the package have simply been missing. 
 
What successful local and regional development also requires is the right national context.  It 
is easier to deliver new and better jobs in less prosperous parts of the country when the UK 
economy as a whole is growing.  This requires an exchange rate that enables British 
businesses to compete effectively in domestic and international markets, interest rates that 
make borrowing affordable and foster investment, and a measured approach to deficit 
reduction.  The right regulatory and taxation regimes need to be in place and – a very 
immediate issue – a Brexit settlement that does not disrupt trade with the EU. 
 
These national issues matter greatly to the regions and local economies.  The specific 
purpose of the present report, however, is to set out the ways Labour can deliver a better 
distribution of jobs and prosperity across the country.  We therefore make the assumption 
that a Labour government will put in place the right framework for national economic growth, 
and that these policies will be set out in full elsewhere.  We also make the assumption that 
Labour will come forward elsewhere with proposals on fair pay, taxation and employment 
rights.  Here we focus on the tools that Labour needs to deploy in order to narrow the 
disturbing gaps in growth and well-being between places. 
 
We begin by considering two of the firm commitments in Labour’s 2017 election manifesto – 
a National Investment Bank and a National Transformation Fund.  We then move on to look 
at other tools for regional and local development that have a role to play in delivering 
Labour’s aspirations. 
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National Investment Bank 
 
 
The establishment of National Investment Bank and its associated regional development 
banks is a Labour policy commitment. 
 
The new Bank is intended to address the failure of the UK banking system to provide longer-
term funding for businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises.  The Bank is 
expected to offer loans and also to support innovative forms of technology and business 
organisation. 
 
The aspiration is that after ten years the Bank might have a balance sheet of approximately 
£250bn, funded by borrowing guaranteed by the UK government12.  The government 
guarantee enables cheaper borrowing, which can then be passed on to businesses as a 
lower rate of interest. 
 
The role of the Bank is not only to help promote national economic growth but also to help 
deliver growth that is better distributed across the country13.  Along with other initiatives, the 
Bank therefore has an important role to play in regional and local economic development 
and this needs to be built into its structures from the outset. 
 
Labour’s proposal is that alongside the Bank’s head office there will be a network of twelve 
regional investment banks – one in each of the English regions and (in collaboration with the 
devolved administrations) in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 
To help rebalance the economy across the regions, a Labour government needs to: 
 
• Allocate proportionately more of the funding available to the National 
Investment Bank to support the UK’s less prosperous local economies 
 
This can best be achieved by taking advantage of the new Bank’s regional structure to 
earmark funding – or more precisely, to set lending targets – for each region. 
 
The intention is that in the first year £20bn might be raised to fund the bank14.  The regions 
and nations of the UK vary in population as well as prosperity but if the share of funding 
based on population were to be adjusted by the ratio of national to regional GVA per head15 
- i.e. to increase the funding where GVA per head is low, so as to encourage investment and 
growth in these parts of the country – the shares of the £20bn would be as follows: 
 
 
                                                          
12 Labour (2017) A National Investment Bank for Britain: putting dynamism into our industrial strategy, 
report to the Shadow Chancellor and Shadow Business Secretary, Labour Party, London. 
13 Labour (2017) Richer Britain, Richer Lives: Labour’s Industrial Strategy, Labour Party, London. 
14 Labour (2017) A National Investment Bank for Britain, op. cit. 
15 The formula here is: Region’s share of UK population x (UK GVA per head / Region’s GVA per 
head).  2016 data.  The calculation includes a small flat-rate percentage adjustment to reconcile the 
resulting UK total with the £20bn total to be allocated. 
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           Funding (£m)    Funding per capita (UK=100) 
 
 Wales     1,300    135 
 North East    1,100    129 
 Northern Ireland      700    127 
 Yorkshire & Humber   1,900    116 
 West Midlands   2,000    113 
 East Midlands    1,600    111 
 North West    2,400    109 
 South West    1,800    105 
 Scotland    1,700    102 
 East     1,800      99 
 South East    2,300      84 
 London    1,400      54 
     --------------------------------------------- 
 UK              20,000    100 
 
 
It is important that the new Bank’s lending is managed so that it does not simply displace 
large amounts of lending by the commercial banks.  Otherwise the impact on local and 
regional economies will be blunted.  It is also important that the Bank’s lending is targeted at 
the businesses that have the greatest potential to drive forward local and regional 
economies.  With this in mind, Labour should: 
 
• Concentrate the Bank’s lending on businesses that sell to outside the local 
area, and especially those that export from the UK, to help minimise the 
displacement of activity from other local businesses 
 
Of course, this would not preclude investment in businesses that displace imports into an 
area (and into the UK) which have the potential to make an equally positive contribution to 
overall growth.  Most manufacturing firms should be able to meet these criteria but so too will 
a great many service-sector firms that look beyond purely local markets. 
 
 
 
National Transformation Fund 
 
 
The National Transformation Fund is another Labour policy commitment16.  The intention is 
that £250bn will be invested over ten years to upgrade the infrastructure that underpins the 
UK economy.  The aim is to use infrastructure investment to boost the economy by speeding 
the movement of people, goods and information, but because just about all infrastructure 
investments have a specific location the Fund’s spending can be expected to have important 
regional and local impacts as well. 
 
                                                          
16 Labour (2017) Creating an Economy That Works for All, Labour Party, London. 
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The Labour manifesto for the 2017 general election gave a commitment to support a number 
of infrastructure projects17.  Some of these projects (Tyne & Wear metro rolling stock, East-
West rail in the Midlands and Eastern England, and HS2 links) have recently been adopted 
by government and are likely to be underway by the time of the next election18.  At around 
£70bn in total, the completion of HS2 will also remain a major claim on infrastructure 
spending for some years to come.  Labour will need to take stock of existing commitments 
on entering government and identify further investments on the basis of the available funding 
and the potential benefit to local and regional economies and the UK as a whole.  Beyond 
existing commitments, a Labour government should therefore: 
 
• Use the National Transformation Fund to support a range of local projects that 
promote regional and local development 
 
There is generally no shortage of such projects but there is potential overlap with existing 
government programmes notably: 
 
National Productivity Investment Fund 
This bundles together a number of programmes targeted at housing, transport, digital 
communications and R&D and in theory should be worth £7bn a year by 2022-2319. 
 
Transforming Cities Fund 
This is a budget line established in the 2017 Autumn Budget to accelerate capital 
investment in intra-city transport connections.  A total of £1.7bn over four years has 
been allocated to this new sub-part of the National Productivity Investment Fund. 
 
Local Growth Fund 
This currently provides a total of more than £3bn in funding to Local Enterprise 
Partnerships in England, mainly towards the cost of transport and property schemes, 
allocated through a bidding process. 
 
Bearing in mind the overlap between existing budget lines and the proposed National 
Transformation Fund, Labour should: 
 
• Integrate the relevant parts of the National Productivity Investment Fund, the 
Transforming Cities Fund and the Local Growth Fund into the new National 
Transformation Fund 
 
In England, the funding allocation for schemes needs to combine local discretion with the 
national priorities identified by Highways England and Network Rail.  In practice, this means 
that whilst some funding might be devolved, for example to combined authorities, other 
elements would be retained by central government.  Labour should however: 
 
  
                                                          
17 Labour Party (2017) Richer Britain, Richer Lives: Labour’s Industrial Strategy, Labour Party, 
London. 
18 HM Treasury (2017) Autumn Budget 2017, HM Treasury, London. 
19 Autumn Budget 2017, Table 2.1 
20 
 
• Revise the Treasury’s assessment criteria for transport projects to give more 
weight to regional and local economic development 
 
At present, the Treasury’s project evaluation criteria give the greatest weight to time savings 
arising from reduced congestion and value the time of highly-paid workers most.  This has 
the effect of prioritising transport investment in and around London, where congestion 
combines with high wages, fuelling a seemingly never-ending spiral of growth and still further 
spending in this corner of the country20.  The entirely reasonable alternative would be to tilt 
infrastructure spending towards places where it unlocks new opportunities for development. 
 
In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, transport is a devolved matter.  The devolved 
administrations’ share of the National Transformation Fund would therefore be allocated 
through the Barnett formula. 
 
 
 
A successor to the EU Structural Funds 
 
 
Assuming Brexit goes ahead, the UK will eventually stop being a recipient of EU Structural 
Funds.  The disappearance of the EU Funds opens up a huge gap in regional and local 
economic development across the UK. 
 
As part of the ‘divorce bill’ agreed between the UK government and EU in December 2017 
the UK will continue to contribute to the Funds as normal up to the end of 2020, when the 
EU’s present spending round comes to an end, even if Brexit happens as planned in March 
2019, and the UK will continue to draw on the Funds as normal until then, including for 
projects that run on until 2023.  In July 2018 the Treasury underwrote this arrangement in 
the event of a no-deal Brexit.  But crucially beyond the end of 2020, in all circumstances, 
there will be no commitment of new EU monies. 
 
The UK has been a recipient of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and 
European Social Fund (ESF) since the 1970s.  Indeed, the ERDF was established as part of 
the UK’s accession negotiations.  In 1988, the ERDF and ESF were brought together to form 
the Structural Funds and their share of the EU budget was increased to around one third, 
which has remained broadly the same to the present day. 
 
The Structural Funds are based around four principles: 
 
• Programming: funds are delivered through multi-annual programmes 
 
• Partnership: programmes are agreed by economic and social partners in a region, 
along with the national government and European Commission 
 
                                                          
20 See Industrial Strategy Commission (2017) Final Report of the Industrial Strategy Commission, 
Manchester and Sheffield Universities. 
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• Additionality: EU funding should be additional to national expenditure 
 
• Concentration: funding is allocated to local areas against defined criteria, such as 
GVA per head and unemployment 
 
The devolved administrations, local authorities, and economic and social partners such as 
business groups, universities, FE colleges and the voluntary sector have been active users 
of the Structural Funds.  Recent innovative examples include the establishment of revolving 
loan funds (through what is known as the JESSICA programme) and the introduction of 
community economic development.  The Structural Funds require matching finance from the 
public, and where appropriate, private sectors.  Structural Fund programmes focus on: 
 
• Business support (advice, workforce development, finance) 
 
• Research, technological development and innovation 
 
• Infrastructure investment (transportation, ICT and environmental) 
 
• Skills and training, typically for groups such as young people, the long-term 
unemployed or disadvantaged groups 
 
• Community economic development 
 
• Place-based development such as the remediation of contaminated land or 
development of urban centres. 
 
Structural Funds programmes have been subject to extensive monitoring and evaluation, 
though establishing ‘what would have happened in the absence of EU funding’ is neither 
easy nor precise.  A study on the impact of ERDF spending in the UK over the 2007-13 
programming period21 put the direct job creation at over 150,000, of which nearly 30,000 
were in SMEs and nearly 4,000 in research.  A parallel evaluation22 of the 2007-13 ESF 
programme in England identified around two million people who had taken part in ESF-
funded activities and more than 250,000 who had been helped in gaining basic skills. 
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the Structural Funds in the UK, and especially in 
England, has been beset with challenges not always experienced to the same extent 
elsewhere in the EU.  This is for a range of reasons including institutional upheaval and 
under-investment in institutional capacity23. 
 
  
                                                          
21 European Commission (2016) Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2007-2013, 
focusing on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF):Task 3 
United Kingdom Task Report, European Commission, Brussels. 
22 ICF (2016) England ESF Programme 2007–2013 Evidence synthesis, DWP, London. 
23 See J Bachtler and I Begg (2017) ‘Cohesion policy after Brexit: the economic, social and 
institutional challenges’, Journal of Social Policy. 
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EU Structural Funds allocation to the UK regions, 2014-20, €m 
 
 
Black Country    176.6  North Eastern   537.4 
Buckinghamshire Thames Valley   13.8  Northamptonshire    54.8 
Cheshire & Warrington   141.6  Oxfordshire     19.3 
Coast to Capital     67.0  Sheffield City Region  207.2 
Cornwall    590.4  Solent      42.9 
Coventry & Warwickshire  135.5  South East   185.1 
Cumbria      91.0  South East Midlands    87.9 
D2N2     244.0  Stoke & Staffordshire  160.9 
Dorset       47.1  Swindon & Wiltshire    43.4 
Enterprise M3      45.5  Tees Valley   201.7 
Gloucestershire      38.1  Thames Valley Berkshire   28.5 
Greater Birmingham & Solihull  254.8  The Marches   113.3 
Greater Cambridge & Peterborough   75.2  West of England    68.3 
Greater Lincolnshire   133.0  Worcestershire     67.8 
Greater Manchester   413.8  York & North Yorkshire    97.1 
Heart of the South West   117.8 
Hertfordshire      69.2  East Wales   406.6 
Humber    102.0  West Wales & the Valleys       2.005.9 
Lancashire    265.2 
Leeds City Region   389.5  Highlands & Islands  193.0 
Leicester & Leicestershire  125.7  Rest of Scotland  701.6 
Liverpool City Region   220.9 
London     745.4  Northern Ireland  513.4 
New Anglia      94.1 
 
Source: HM Government 
 
 
In the present 2014-20 spending round the UK is set to receive a total of £9bn (at the current 
exchange rate) from the Structural Funds, or around £1.3bn a year.  Wales receives £2.1bn 
– a reflection of the top-priority status of West Wales & the Valleys – whilst £800m is 
earmarked for Scotland and £500m for Northern Ireland.  Almost £6bn is due to come to 
England. 
 
EU funding has always been strongly targeted at less prosperous regions, not just across 
Europe as a whole but also within the UK.  In the current 2014-20 spending round, Cornwall 
as well as West Wales & the Valleys has top-priority ‘less developed’ region status because 
both areas started with a GDP per head below 75 per cent of the EU average.  They receive 
more than £1,000 a head over the programme period.  The Highlands & Islands receive 
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£400 a head on the basis of low population density and Northern Ireland’s funding, nearly 
£300 a head, is boosted to support the peace process. 
 
For the rest of the UK, the EU allocated two pots of money – one for areas with between 75 
and 90 per cent of EU average GDP per head (‘transition regions’) and a less generous pot 
for areas above the 90 per cent threshold (‘more developed regions’) 
 
In England, the Conservative-led coalition government chose to allocate the EU funding to 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), who manage the selection of projects within the 
framework of EU guidelines and national and local plans.  The LEPs covering older industrial 
areas in the North and Midlands, many of which qualified as ‘transition regions’, generally 
receive more per head than more prosperous parts of the South.  Tees Valley, for example, 
receives £300 per head, compared to £90 per head in London and £30 per head in 
Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire Thames Valley and Solent.  However, in the present round 
there were also errors that distorted the funding allocation24. 
 
It is still too early to assess the impact of the present round of EU funding, especially at the 
regional or local scale.  At the end of 2017, only around half the money due to the UK had 
been committed and, because spending lags behind commitments, only around 10 per cent 
of the money had actually been spent25.  This schedule is normal.  There is, however, no 
obvious reason why the final impact of the current round of EU spending should be less than 
in earlier rounds, or to suppose that the impact across the country will be other than broadly 
proportional to the size of the financial allocation. 
 
The key question is what, if anything, will replace the EU funds.  Money apart, there are 
certainly important aspects of the funds that are worth maintaining, such as support for 
innovation and technological development, entrepreneurship, skills and employment, social 
inclusion and local carbon agendas.  Additionally, the delivery of policies at the lowest most 
appropriate tier of government, something long associated with the EU funds, is well worth 
retaining. 
 
The Conservative manifesto for the 2017 General Election promised to replace the EU 
Structural Funds by a new UK Shared Prosperity Fund.  The intention is that the new Fund 
will use the Structural Fund money coming back to the UK “to reduce inequalities between 
communities across our four nations”.  The intention is also that the new Fund will be “cheap 
to administer, low in bureaucracy and targeted where it is needed most”.  The likelihood is 
that a Labour government will inherit the UK Shared Prosperity Fund or, at the very least, 
advanced plans for its implementation. 
 
It would make sense for a Labour government to keep the new Fund.  The devolved 
administrations have been explicit in calling for a follow-on to EU funding of at least the 
same magnitude and this aspiration is shared by local authorities in much of England.  
Furthermore, starting again from scratch with something different would almost certainly lead 
to an unwelcome hiatus in funding.  Labour should therefore: 
                                                          
24 The Liverpool and Sheffield city regions received less than they might reasonably have expected 
owing to a flaw in the way the Department for Business determined the allocations. 
25 European Commission figures. 
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• Implement a replacement for the EU Structural Funds but be prepared to 
modify the details inherited from the Conservatives – and perhaps re-brand the 
revised Fund to give it a new identity 
 
Importantly, the Conservative manifesto made no commitment about the scale of the new 
Fund.  This is in marked contrast to the promise to farmers that they will receive not a penny 
less when the UK leaves the EU.  With UK regional and local divides as wide as ever, there 
is no obvious reason why spending on regional and local economic development should be 
reduced following Brexit.  Labour should therefore: 
 
• Commit to a replacement for the EU Structural Funds worth at least £1.5bn a 
year, which allowing for inflation would match the funding presently coming 
from the EU 
 
This would not be new money that the Chancellor would have to find.  This is money that 
pre-Brexit would have been paid to the EU and then returned to the UK.  In its supporting 
documentation for the Chancellor’s 2018 Spring Statement, the Office for Budget 
Responsibility identifies more than £13bn a year that will eventually no longer be paid over to 
the EU, beginning with £3bn in 2020-21 and rising steeply thereafter as spending 
commitments tail off26.  Labour should: 
 
• Manage the replacement funding to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
outside the Barnett formula, in the same way as EU funds are managed at 
present 
 
Managing the replacement funding outside the Barnett formula ensures that Wales, in 
particular, receives a significantly higher share of the pot, reflecting its needs, than if the 
formula had applied.  Labour should also: 
 
• Operate the replacement for the EU funds on the basis of multiannual financial 
allocations in order to create certainty, foster stability and allow the proper 
planning of ambitious longer-term projects 
 
It would be wrong, however, to replicate the many faults in EU funding.  The present rules 
and regulations are overly restrictive, the implementation bureaucratic and the auditing 
pedantic.  Brexit offers the opportunity to organise things differently.  For example, the 
artificial division between ERDF and ESF funding streams reflects organisational structures 
in Brussels rather than realities on-the-ground and the thematic constraints on spending 
have become too narrow.  Labour should: 
 
• Deliver a replacement for the EU funds that provides more efficient, more 
flexible support, with greater opportunity to tailor local spending to local 
priorities within the framework of national and local plans 
 
                                                          
26 Office for Budget Responsibility (2018) Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2018, OBR, London. 
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The allocation of the new Fund across the country is a huge issue.  There are two big fears.  
One is that the Conservative government will shift resources away from the less prosperous 
parts of the country (mainly in the Midlands, the North, Scotland and Wales) towards 
southern England.  The other is that it will impose a centrally-managed bidding process that 
would be vastly wasteful of time and energy and could result in a similar shift in resources as 
well as open the door to favouritism. 
 
Labour needs to ensure that the replacement for the EU Structural Funds is a tool for 
narrowing the gaps in prosperity between different parts of the country.  It also needs to 
respect the role of the devolved administrations in setting their own priorities.  Labour should 
therefore: 
 
• Allocate the new Fund between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
on the same basis as the present-day division of EU funding – the recent shifts 
in relative prosperity do not for the moment justify a change 
 
• Deploy the funding within England to target less prosperous regions and local 
economies, using local data and transparent allocation criteria 
 
 
 
State Aid rules 
 
 
EU State Aid rules presently set limits on the extent to which public sector financial support 
can be offered to private sector businesses.  The State Aid rules are central to the 
architecture the EU has established to deliver fair competition across Europe and in principle 
they are something the UK has always welcomed. 
 
Nevertheless, State Aid is not something that should be seen as universally ‘bad’ and indeed 
this has never been the view of the UK or the European Union.  State Aid can help deliver 
desirable outcomes by incentivising certain behaviours or actions by private sector 
companies.  Acceptable forms of State Aid are mostly about encouraging investment in plant 
and machinery, skills, R&D and environmental measures.  By contrast, straightforward 
operating subsidies or bail-outs for bankrupt firms are generally undesirable and are 
something the rules nearly always prohibit. 
 
In the context of regional and local development, State Aid can be an important tool in 
encouraging firms to invest in less prosperous areas.  Indeed, financial support of this kind is 
arguably the single most direct way of promoting jobs and growth in the regions.  State Aid 
has often been central in delivering inward investment, particularly in manufacturing. 
 
The extent to which the UK will have to continue to live within EU State Aid rules beyond 
Brexit is a matter for negotiation and one that is unlikely to be settled before the UK’s trading 
relationship with the EU is finalised.  A transition period through to the end of 2020, when the 
existing EU rules would continue to apply, has provisionally been agreed.  Beyond 2020, it is 
likely that in order to maintain easy access to the Single Market the UK will have to continue 
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to accept the EU State Aid rules, in whole or in part, even if it has no future input into framing 
them.  A ‘harder’ Brexit would leave the UK with a freer hand to set its own rules. 
 
Taking the continuation of the EU rules first, the striking thing is how little the UK presently 
makes use of the existing opportunities to support business.  As a recent Select Committee 
report27 noted, EU data makes it clear that many other economies in Europe spend a 
considerably higher proportion of their GDP on State Aid than the UK does.  In 2015, for 
example, France spent almost twice as much as a proportion of GDP, and Germany three 
and a half times as much28.  This is not because the State Aid rules applying to the UK are 
any more restrictive. 
 
The aid allowed under the present EU rules29 that is of most value to Labour in pursuing its 
regional and industrial strategy covers: 
 
• Regional investment aid – up to 30 per cent (depending on the area) of the capital cost 
of projects, with additional top-ups for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
 
• Aid to SMEs – up to 20 per cent of investment costs and 50 per cent of consultancy 
costs. 
 
• Aid for research and development cost – up to 50 per cent of the eligible costs of 
industrial research for example. 
 
• Training aid – up to 50 per cent of eligible costs, with additional premiums for disabled or 
disadvantaged workers and for SMEs. 
 
• Aid for environmental protection – up to 40 per cent of eligible costs, again with top ups 
for SMEs. 
 
If these EU rules (or an up-dated version) continue to apply to the UK beyond Brexit, a 
Labour government should: 
 
• Commit to making greater use of the EU State Aid rules, so long as they apply, 
to deliver support for a wide range of activity to support businesses, especially 
in less prosperous areas 
 
If the EU State Aid rules no longer apply the UK will need to design a State Aid regime of its 
own and the present government has earmarked the Competition and Markets Authority to 
take on this responsibility.  The alternative would be an unseemly free-for-all by businesses 
to attract attention and press their case for financial support.  If the UK has to design its own 
regime the ultimate constraint will be World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules.  These lack the 
detail that underpins the EU rules.  Broadly, outright subsidies to exports or to use domestic 
                                                          
27 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (2017) Industrial Strategy: first review, Second 
report of session 2016-17, House of Commons, London. 
28 European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard 2016 
29 European Commission, General Block Exemption – Regulations declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, Official 
Journal of the European Union, 26 June 2014. 
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goods instead of imports are prohibited.  All other subsidies are not prohibited but are 
‘actionable’ – they can be challenged by other WTO countries if they hurt their domestic 
producers.  In effect, under WTO rules the limit on most State Aid is what the UK thinks it 
can get away with. 
 
It is unlikely that a Labour government would want to subsidise private industry on a scale 
that would risk retribution through WTO channels but there are a number of ways in which 
the current rules on regional aid set by the EU should be reformed if they became a solely 
UK responsibility, for example: 
 
• The aid intensity ceilings should be re-set at levels that are sufficiently high to make a 
difference to company decisions.  The present 10 per cent ceiling for regional investment 
aid to larger companies (250+ employees worldwide) in most UK Assisted Areas is 
simply too low. 
 
• For larger firms there needs to be the flexibility to support re-investment in existing 
plants, which in most Assisted Areas is prohibited under the present EU rules. 
 
• The coverage of the Assisted Area map (see below) should reflect economic 
disadvantage in the UK – the present population coverage, dictated by EU rules, is too 
low and the map needs to be rooted in realities on the ground, not shoe-horned by EU 
rules into artificial units of 100,000 people. 
 
A Labour government should therefore: 
 
• Exploit any post-Brexit flexibility to set UK State Aid rules that are better 
aligned to an active Industrial Strategy and to the promotion of a better balance 
of growth and jobs across the country 
 
State Aid might be funded from a range of budget lines, depending on the purpose and form 
of the assistance.  Historically, the UK’s Department for Business and the devolved 
administrations have run schemes but the new National Investment Bank might consider 
discounted loans and there may be scope for the new National Infrastructure Fund to play a 
role as well. 
 
There remains the question of who should authorise payments, whether under the EU rules 
or a new UK variety.  This is important because Labour should aim to offer financial support 
only when it makes a difference to firms’ decisions.  It should not subside projects that would 
have gone ahead anyway.  Over the years the UK has accumulated substantial experience 
in making these difficult judgements but it is a specialist task and the expertise is 
concentrated in a handful of organisations – essentially the Department for Business and the 
equivalent sections of the devolved administrations or their development agencies.  Prudent 
management of public funds would suggest that final decision making needs to remain in 
these hands. 
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Assisted Area map 
 
 
The Assisted Area map is a key tool of UK regional policy, though one badly neglected by 
the present Conservative government. 
 
The Assisted Area map defines the areas where financial support can be given to private 
sector investment projects that create or protect jobs.  The present map is an offshoot of the 
EU State Aid rules but the UK map has a long history, extending back well before EU 
membership.  Over the years, the map has set the framework within which successive 
programmes of business support have been delivered – Regional Development Grants, 
Regional Selective Assistance, Selective Finance for Industry in England, Grants for 
Business Investment and the Regional Growth Fund. 
 
The evidence is that these programmes have delivered countless thousands of additional 
jobs30.  They have been particularly helpful in delivering inward investment, including by 
companies from abroad.  Indeed, at a time when Brexit is creating uncertainty for many 
businesses the ability to offer financial support of this kind to encourage firms to retain and 
expand production in the UK should be of particular value. 
 
The current UK Assisted Area map runs until the end of 2020.  In total, around a quarter of 
the UK population is covered by the map, which identifies two categories of Assisted Area: 
 
Category ‘a’ areas 
These cover West Wales & the Valleys and Cornwall (the same areas prioritised by 
EU funds) plus Tees Valley & Durham, which was added in 2017.  The maximum aid 
allowed to larger firms in these areas is 30 per cent of the investment cost.  The aid 
ceiling for SMEs is up to 50 per cent. 
 
Category ‘c’ areas 
These cover large parts of Britain outside the most prosperous parts of the country, 
especially in the Midlands, the North and Scotland, including the whole of Highlands 
& Islands which qualifies because of its low population density.  The ‘c’ areas, though 
mostly small on the map, cover many key industrial areas.  The maximum aid 
intensity for large firms in these areas is 10 per cent31, but the ceiling is again up to 
20 per cent higher for SMEs. 
 
  
                                                          
30 See for example M Hart et al (2008) Evaluation of Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and its 
successor Selective Finance for Investment in England (SFIE), BERR occasional paper no 2, London. 
31 15 per cent in Highlands & Islands. 
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UK ASSISTED AREA MAP TO 2020 
 
 
Source: HM Government  
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In England, the Assisted Area map has largely fallen into disuse since 2015, even though it 
remains in force and allows business support in the places where it is needed most.  The 
last major scheme to take advantage of the map was the Regional Growth Fund, which in its 
final two rounds allocated £300m a year to businesses, primarily in the Assisted Areas 
because that is where the State Aid rules allow aid to larger firms and higher aid intensities.  
The Regional Growth Fund, which operated though a competitive bidding process, provided 
investment aid to firms to support projects that would not otherwise have gone ahead, 
including for example a number of projects in the motor industry where the alternative was 
often investment at sites outside the UK.  The National Audit Office estimated that by 2014 
the Regional Growth Fund was set to create or protect 44,000 jobs32.  In 2015 the Regional 
Growth Fund was discontinued without a replacement. 
 
The Welsh Government continues to take advantage of the higher aid intensity ceiling in 
West Wales & the Valleys through the provision of grants and loans to companies.  The 
Scottish Government continues to use the Assisted Area map to provide investment aid to 
companies (Regional Selective Assistance) currently worth around £20m a year, down from 
around £50m a year since 2014 when the EU rules were tightened. 
 
The effect, for the moment, is to disadvantage England’s less prosperous areas as a location 
for new investment, not just in relation to Scotland and Wales but also in relation to other EU 
countries, including Germany and France and just about all of central and eastern Europe, 
where governments continue to take advantage of the State Aid rules and Assisted Area 
status to promote investment and jobs in their less prosperous regions. 
 
If EU State Aid rules continue to apply to the UK after Brexit these will continue to include an 
Assisted Area map.  In the absence of the EU rules, the UK will have the scope to define its 
own map on the basis of its own criteria.  Either way, Labour should: 
 
• Welcome the opportunity that an Assisted Area map provides to target 
investment support at firms in less prosperous parts of the country 
 
For a Labour government committed not only to promoting an industrial revival but also to 
rebalancing away from an over-dependence on London and the South East, making full use 
of the Assisted Area map should be a priority.  Labour should therefore: 
 
• Re-introduce a budget line in England to provide financial support for 
investment by firms in the Assisted Areas 
 
The new budget line could be established as a component of the new National 
Transformation Fund.  The scale of funding depends in part on scope for intervention 
provided by the post-2020 State Aid rules.  At £300m a year it would match the average pre-
2015 funding, though that was in a period when the EU rules were less restrictive.  At £500m 
a year it would account for just 2 per cent of the proposed new Fund. 
  
                                                          
32 National Audit Office (2014) Progress Report on Regional Growth Fund, NAO, London. 
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Enterprise Zones 
 
 
Enterprise Zones were first introduced to Britain in the early 1980s.  They have had a mixed 
record.  However, implemented properly Enterprise Zones can be an important tool in 
promoting jobs in some of the most disadvantaged communities.  EZ status is useful 
because it targets specific development sites in specific places. 
 
A Labour government will inherit the new generation of Enterprise Zones established since 
2010. 
 
The hard-won lesson of the Enterprise Zone initiative is that simply drawing lines on maps 
doesn’t work.  EZ status can help bring in jobs but only once the basic infrastructure – roads, 
utilities, cleared sites – is all in place.  This is what happened in the Dearne Valley EZ for 
example, designated in 1994 in the heart of the former South Yorkshire coalfield after 
substantial preparatory work by the local authorities, where nearly 7,000 new jobs had been 
created by 200733. 
 
The problem with the new generation of Enterprise Zones34 is that the investment incentives 
are a shadow of those previously available.  The old, pre-2010 package comprised: 
 
• A ten-year rate-free holiday for businesses 
• 100% capital allowances for investment in buildings 
• Relaxed planning controls 
 
In practice, the relaxed planning controls meant little in most EZs, which actually required 
clear zoning in advance.  The capital allowances however were a powerful incentive to 
developers, and the rate-free holiday was an attractive marketing tool. 
 
The new, post-2010 EZs benefit from a much weaker package: 
 
• A rate-free holiday for just three years, capped at £55,000 per business per year 
• Relaxed planning 
• A commitment to high-speed broadband 
 
It would be fair to describe the new generation of EZs as not much more than a marketing 
badge.  Nevertheless, having a tool that can zoom-in on specific places where development 
is needed most is a useful addition to powers, such as those provided by the Assisted Area 
map, which apply across much wider areas.  An effective, locally-focussed package can be 
especially helpful in responding to the consequences of a major factory closure, for example, 
or to entrenched difficulties in the hardest-to-help locations. 
 
                                                          
33 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research (2009) Enterprise Zones Monitoring Report, 
CLG, London. 
34 For full details of the new Enterprise Zones see House of Commons (2016) Enterprise Zones, 
briefing paper 5942, House of Commons, London. 
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A Labour government needs to keep its options open, for example in being able to respond 
to major unexpected job losses, which are something no government can hope to avoid.  
The present Enterprise Zone package, however, is weak and discredited.  Labour should 
therefore: 
 
• Replace the present Enterprise Zones with a smaller number of ‘Business 
Investment Zones’ with an enhanced package of incentives 
 
The new Business Investment Zones need to offer the key incentive missing from the 
present EZ package – capital allowances for investment in buildings.  This incentive triggers 
investment in new industrial and commercial floorspace, which in turn attracts firms looking 
to expand and creates jobs in the area.  In the Assisted Areas in particular, capital 
allowances should normally be wholly compatible with State Aid rules. 
 
The location of Business Investment Zones needs to be determined carefully.  They need to 
be located where they are accessible to disadvantaged communities, including by public 
transport, and it is important to avoid firms engaging in short-distance ‘boundary hopping’ so 
that the jobs created are generally additional to the local area. 
 
 
 
Business rates 
 
 
Conservative governments have traditionally viewed business rates as a tax that damages 
growth and which should therefore be reduced, even though business rates currently raise 
around £30bn a year to help fund public services, only fractionally less than Council Tax35.  
Furthermore, since the Thatcher years local authorities have not been trusted to set their 
own business rate so what was once an independent funding stream has effectively been 
nationalised.  The present Conservative plan is that local authorities in England should be 
allowed to retain the money they collect in business rates but they will be given only the 
most circumscribed powers to levy an increase, and only if they have an elected mayor. 
 
There is much muddled thinking about the impact of business rates.  This is because the 
businesses that pay the bills are not necessarily the ones on which the financial burden 
ultimately falls.  In practice, the level of property taxes like business rates interacts with the 
level of rents landlords are able to charge.  The higher the business rate, the lower the rent a 
property will command.  Conversely, the lower the business rate, the higher the rent the 
landlord is able to get away with. 
 
This matters because with most businesses occupying rented property the real burden of 
business rates actually ends up falling on the owners of land and property.  For example, 
when a ten-year rate-free holiday was granted to firms in the original Enterprise Zones the 
effect was to push up rents in the Zones36. 
                                                          
35 Autumn Budget 2017, Table C.5 
36 PA Cambridge Economic Consultants (1995) Final Evaluation of Enterprise Zones, HMSO, London. 
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Similarly, a study of the impact of business rates on the location of employment37, 
commissioned by government at the time when local authorities still had the power to vary 
the business rate, found no evidence of a relationship between the level of business rates 
and the growth of local employment.  That this study drew on statistics for every local 
authority in England and Wales and paid particularly detailed attention to the manufacturing 
sector adds weight to its findings. 
 
That the burden of business rates ultimately falls on landowners rather than occupiers casts 
a very different light on policy options.  It suggests, for example, that the Conservative faith 
in cutting business rates to promote growth is ill-founded: the real winners are likely to be 
landlords who will charge higher rents.  Likewise, it suggests that the fear of restoring local 
authority control over the level of business rates – the arrangement that prevailed prior to 
1990 – is unreasonable. 
 
With pilot schemes already underway, a Labour government will inherit elements of the 
Conservatives’ ‘business rates retention’ even if the scheme has not been fully rolled out. 
 
If the impact of business rates falls on landowners rather than businesses, as the evidence 
would suggest, Labour should:  
 
• Avoid being seduced into thinking that lowering business rates can be an 
important tool of economic development 
 
 
 
Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 
 
 
The biggest tranche of new money earmarked to support the Conservative government’s 
industrial policy is for the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund.  In April 2017 the Business 
Secretary announced £1bn in funding, to be spent by 2020-2138, targeted at research and 
development in six sectors: 
 
 Healthcare and medicine 
 Robotics and artificial intelligence 
 Batteries for clean and flexible energy storage 
 Self-driving vehicles 
 Manufacturing and materials for the future 
 Satellites and space technology 
 
                                                          
37 P Crawford, S Fothergill and S Monk (1985) The Effect of Business Rates on the Location of 
Employment, Department of Land Economy, Cambridge, report to the Department of the 
Environment. 
38 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2017) Business Secretary announces 
Industrial Challenge Fund investments, press release 21 April. 
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The White Paper on Industrial Strategy39 allocated a further £725m to be distributed to ‘clean 
growth’, ‘AI and data’ and ‘ageing society’. 
 
This additional support for R&D should help move closer to Labour’s aspiration that 3 per 
cent of GDP is spent on R&D by 203040, though in itself the present Industrial Strategy 
Challenge Fund is worth only just over 0.02 per cent of GDP, illustrating the immense scale 
of the challenge. 
 
The problems with the Fund run deeper however.  As a recent report41 on its first stage 
demonstrated, the focus is actually on an exceptionally narrow group of industries at the very 
leading edge of technology, accounting for at best little more than 1 per cent of the whole 
economy (by employment) and 10 per cent of UK manufacturing.  Furthermore, the report 
highlighted the risk that the focus on high-end research will mean that in the first instance 
much of the funding will end up in laboratories in and around Oxford, Cambridge and 
London, thereby actually widening regional divides. 
 
A Labour government will inherit the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund.  It should honour 
existing contracts but needs to re-think the scale, purpose, organisation and focus of what 
follows next.  Labour should: 
 
• Deliver support for R&D to a wider range of sectors in a wider range of 
locations across the country 
 
Much of what remains of UK manufacturing is actually ‘high tech’ – it has had to be in order 
to survive in a globalised economy.  There needs to be public sector support for R&D in a 
wide range of industries currently ignored by the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund – 
sectors such as steel, chemicals, aerospace, rail engineering, food & drink manufacturing, oil 
& gas, defence equipment and more. 
 
Many of these are important employers away from London and the South East and 
strengthening their performance would contribute to rebalancing the economy across the 
country.  Indeed, there is more than a whiff of ‘picking winners’ – an approach much 
discredited by experience – in the Conservatives’ narrow sectoral focus. 
 
The other step Labour should take is to: 
 
• Move away from predominantly supporting research to a greater emphasis on 
product development, dissemination, good practice and the commercialisation 
of ideas 
 
  
                                                          
39 HM Government (2017) Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain fit for the future, HM Government, 
London. 
40 Labour Party (2017) Richer Britain, Richer Lives: Labour’s Industrial Strategy, Labour Party, 
London. 
41 S Fothergill, T Gore and P Wells (2017) Industrial Strategy and the Regions: the shortcomings of a 
narrow sectoral focus, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University. 
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The UK’s long-standing problem is not so much in developing new scientific and technical 
ideas as in applying them in the real world of production.  It is a false assumption that where 
new ideas are first developed will be where down-stream production will necessarily take 
place42.  In reality, new ideas – and often the people who develop them – circulate widely 
around the world. 
 
What British industry needs most is help in applying existing best practice in product design, 
manufacture, marketing and distribution.  This sort of activity is less glamorous but likely to 
deliver greater returns across a wider range of sectors and places. 
 
Input measures such as R&D spending are useful indicators for international comparison but 
they can mask how effectively innovation actually works, and whether public funding crowds-
out private investment or levers-in investment from a range of sources.  In the UK, the 
criticism of innovation is rarely the quality or the amount (though there can always be 
improvements) but the limited impact of these inputs on the wider economy.  In particular, a 
pressing need is to address the long tail of firms that lag behind international comparators in 
terms of productivity. 
 
A practical way in which all this could be achieved is by re-focussing the Industrial Strategy 
Challenge Fund as existing spending commitments come to an end.  This provides the 
opportunity to: 
 
• Extend eligibility to a much wider range of sectors, including the whole of 
manufacturing 
 
• Refocus away from primary research to a more inclusive approach embracing 
product development and the application of existing ideas and technology 
 
• Encourage the involvement of businesses beyond those that have traditionally 
engaged in significant R&D 
 
To help promote the engagement of firms that have hitherto shied away from R&D, advice 
and financial support to work up proposals could also be made available through the new UK 
Shared Prosperity Fund (or its Labour successor). 
 
Within limits, aid to businesses for R&D would normally be compatible with State Aid rules. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
42 See D Egerton (2006) The Shock of the Old: technology and global history since 1900, Profile 
Books, London. 
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Skills 
 
The strongest local economies usually have a highly trained workforce.  Conversely, the 
places that lag behind generally have fewer graduates and fewer high-skill workers.  But to 
blame slow growth and unemployment on the quality of the local workforce is to confuse 
cause and effect.  In practice, high-skill workers tend to be the most mobile, moving to where 
suitable jobs are available.  London’s economy sucks in graduates from across Britain and 
the globe; in many rural, seaside and older industrial areas, high achievers at school move 
away to university and then never return. 
 
Investment in training and skills is a national priority that a Labour government would 
undoubtedly pursue in all parts of the country.  There is a good case, however, for boosting 
the effort in less prosperous local economies because once an area’s workforce has been 
stripped of many of the most able and qualified it can become difficult for employers that rely 
on high-skill workers.  New investors are put off and existing businesses find it harder to 
expand because of local skill shortages. 
 
The European Social Fund (ESF) has for many years provided this additional targeted 
support for training in UK areas with higher unemployment.  Brexit means that beyond 2020 
ESF funding will disappear.  This is a major loss that has the potential to cause huge 
damage to skills providers and Further Education colleges, especially in the least prosperous 
parts of the UK.  A Labour government should therefore: 
 
• Supplement national support for training and skills by earmarking a substantial 
proportion of the replacement for the EU Structural Funds for skills 
development in less prosperous local economies 
 
This was also one of the strong recommendations of a recent Select Committee inquiry43. 
 
The most significant recent change in the skills landscape has been the introduction in 2017 
of the Apprenticeship Levy, paid at the rate of 0.5 per cent on payrolls over £3m a year.  In 
England44, employers can draw on funds in their account to pay for training.  The early 
evidence45 is that the Levy is seen by many employers as a tax rather than a fund to invest 
in skills and it may be a cause of a fall in the number of new apprenticeship starts.  There 
are also concerns that the quality of much of the apprenticeship offer falls short of what is 
really required.  In view of the inauspicious start and the skills needs in less prosperous parts 
of the country, Labour would be well advised to: 
 
• Review the Apprenticeship Levy, particularly with reference to its role in skills 
development across regions and local areas 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Work and Pensions Committee (2018) European Social Fund, Eighth report of session 2017-19, 
House of Commons, London.  
44 Apprenticeships are a devolved matter in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
45 Guardian, 25 January 2018. 
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Public procurement 
 
 
Labour has already set out its intention to use public procurement as a tool to reshape the 
economy by requiring any company bidding for a public sector contract to recognise trade 
unions and collective bargaining, move towards a narrower wage gap, pay suppliers 
promptly, maintain high environmental standards, provide training, be tax compliant and 
deliver equal opportunities46. 
 
Public sector procurement also has an important role in fostering industry in the regions.  
Plenty of UK firms have the capacity to supply UK needs but too often the contracts seem to 
go elsewhere.  Government procurement plays a key role in many sectors including 
pharmaceuticals, infrastructure, railway rolling stock and defence equipment.  Industries 
such as these make up a significant part of the UK’s industrial capability and skills base, 
often at the highest end of technology and in parts of the country where they are a vital part 
of the local economy. 
 
Orders should not necessarily be earmarked for specific firms – this is anyway difficult under 
competition law – but it is possible to introduce a range of requirements into contracts to 
support local suppliers and jobs and capitalise on local potential, for example by fostering 
clusters of specialist expertise.  In addition, through collaboration and dialogue it is possible 
to ensure that the timing, scale and specification of big public sector contracts allow UK 
suppliers to be prime candidates.  Labour should: 
 
• Use public procurement as a tool to support British industry and promote jobs 
and training in the regions 
 
 
 
Public sector jobs 
 
 
The relocation of public sector jobs from London and the South East has traditionally been 
one of the cheapest and often most durable ways to increase employment opportunities in 
the regions.  It also eases pressure on London’s overloaded infrastructure.  However, the 
size of the public sector workforce both in London and outside is greatly diminished since 
2010 and the implementation of austerity.  The scope for further relocation may be limited. 
 
Nevertheless, public sector employment can make a major contribution to local economies.  
There is little evidence that such employment ‘crowds out’ private investment and most 
public sector jobs – in schools, hospitals, the police and local authorities for example – are 
tied to the location of population.  An end to austerity and to the squeeze on public sector 
services and employment would therefore be of benefit to all local economies. 
 
                                                          
46 Labour Party (2017) Richer Britain, Richer Lives: Labour’s Industrial Strategy, Labour Party, 
London. 
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There are two further avenues for a Labour government to consider.  First, if new central 
government activities are established, either in departments or agencies, they may not need 
to be located in London.  Second, a fresh approach to devolution may mean that certain 
functions are simply better undertaken regionally or locally.  There are plenty of examples of 
where development away from London has been managed well in the past, bringing cost 
savings and efficiency gains as well as benefits to local economies. 
 
It is almost a decade since the last review of the scope for public sector relocation47.  Much 
has changed since then, not least in the pervasive spread of new technology but also the 
reduction in the size of the state, nationally and locally.  There is an opportunity to take stock 
once more.  Labour should: 
 
• Initiate a review of the scope for public sector employment to better contribute 
to reducing economic disparities, whether through decentralisation or 
devolution. 
 
 
 
Energy-intensive industries 
 
 
Some manufacturing industries are unavoidably energy-intensive – steel, ceramics, 
aluminium, cement and heavy chemicals for example.  Many of these industries are located 
in less prosperous parts of the UK where they are often major employers.  Data processing 
‘farms’, too, are energy-intensive. 
 
Carbon taxes and other green charges on electricity are a useful tool to incentivise the move 
towards a low-carbon future but their applicability to energy-intensive industries does not 
always make sense.  By increasing UK costs, the likelihood is that production and jobs will 
simply be diverted abroad with no net reduction in global emissions.  The UK needs to 
honour its commitments under the Paris Accord to reduce carbon emissions but it also 
needs to be smart and targeted in the ways it does so.  A low-carbon future should not 
mean, for some important UK industries, a no-production future. 
 
The Conservative government has exempted energy-intensive industries from some green 
charges but not offset the UK’s higher wholesale price of electricity that results from other 
measures such as the carbon price floor (or ‘carbon tax’ as it is generally better known).  As 
a result, UK energy-intensive industries continue to operate at a disadvantage relative to 
their competitors in the rest of Europe and elsewhere. 
 
To help protect key industrial jobs in the regions, Labour should: 
  
                                                          
47 I Smith (2010) Relocation: transforming where and how government works, HM Treasury, London. 
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• Sustain the international competitiveness of the UK’s energy-intensive 
industries by lowering their electricity bills whilst maintaining interventions to 
deliver a low carbon future 
 
The most immediate way in which this could be achieved is by extending the existing 
exemption from green charges to include the proportion of wholesale electricity costs 
attributable to the carbon tax levied on electricity producers.  As with the existing 
exemptions, the cost of this further measure would be spread across all other electricity 
consumers. 
 
 
 
Trade defence instruments 
 
 
Free trade has brought the benefits of cheaper goods and services, to Britain and to the rest 
of the world.  But there also need to be limits to free trade.  Competition is welcome, but it 
must be fair. 
 
This matters a great deal to jobs in the regions.  The UK’s steel crisis, for example, was 
triggered by a vast surplus of Chinese steel, much of it dumped on world markets at below 
production costs.  The surplus has not gone away and, worryingly, steel could be only the 
first industry to feel the effects of market distortions if the Chinese economy were to slow 
down.  More generally, British manufacturing should not be allowed to suffer as a result of 
unfair competition from countries that fail to respect workers’ rights, health and safety or 
environmental protection. 
 
When the UK leaves the European Union it will need to develop trade defence instruments 
of its own and the Conservative government has promised a new Trade Remedies Authority 
to take over this responsibility.  Worryingly, however, there is a strand of thinking among 
some supporters of Brexit that it should be the trigger to abandon many of the regulations 
that have hitherto protected standards and employment rights in the UK.  This would be an 
unacceptable race to the bottom. 
 
To ensure a level playing field for industry in the regions, Labour should: 
 
• Welcome free trade but ensure that outside the EU the UK is, if necessary, able 
to deploy a full set of trade defence instruments to combat unfair competition 
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4. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The current institutional structures for delivering local and regional growth across the UK are 
complex.  The arrangements in England are different from those in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland and in all parts of the UK there is an unresolved tension between what 
should be decided and delivered locally and what should remain the responsibility of central 
government. 
 
A Labour government could spend much of its first term introducing a whole new set of 
structures.  This would be a mistake.  Whilst there is certainly scope for modifications to 
existing arrangements it is probably more important to get on delivering growth and jobs 
across the country.  As the National Audit Office noted48, the Conservative’s abolition of 
Labour’s Regional Development Agencies introduced at least a two-year hiatus in spending 
on local and regional development in England.  This is an experience not to be repeated. 
 
Most left-leaning governments in OECD countries are now moving towards economic 
development models that emphasise inclusive, smart and sustainable growth within a strong 
institutional framework based on cooperation between government and social and economic 
partners.   Some have pursued such approaches through national strategies whilst others 
have taken more local and place-based approaches.  However, the central state plays a key 
role not just in terms of finance and regulation but also in ensuring there is not unnecessary 
duplication. 
 
There are pointers here for Labour.  A key feature of all these approaches is that they are 
long-term, with institutions remaining in place across electoral cycles.  Excessive institutional 
change has arguably hampered and wasted resources in the UK. 
 
The main alternative to the inclusive, smart, sustainable growth model of development is one 
based on competition and consumer spending, focussing on labour market deregulation and 
cuts to corporate taxation.  Within this model, cities and regions are expected to compete for 
public funding and private investment.  In many respects this has been the strategy in the 
UK (or perhaps more specifically in England) since 2010.  We take it as given that a Labour 
government would want to move away from this particular approach. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
48 National Audit Office (2013) Funding and Structures for Local Economic Growth, NAO, London. 
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Central government 
 
 
There is a key and indeed unavoidable role for central government – i.e. Westminster and 
Whitehall – in setting the framework for local, regional and national development across the 
UK.  At the core this is about: 
 
• Making choices about which parts of the UK should be prioritised for assistance and 
support 
 
• Allocating resources across the UK between competing claims 
 
• Overseeing the actions of local, regional and national players to avoid wasteful 
duplication and ‘bidding wars’ and ensure fair competition. 
 
In addition, there are policy fields well beyond economic development – health, social care, 
education, housing and welfare policies for example – that have overlapping impacts on 
national, regional and local development49.  These links and impacts are important.  They 
point to how a wide range of policies help build a prosperous, inclusive and sustainable 
Britain.  Key policies that are UK government responsibilities and have major regional and 
local impacts include fiscal and monetary and policy and, of course, the UK’s future trading 
relationship with the rest of Europe. 
 
With all these considerations in mind, a Labour government should: 
 
• Retain ultimate, central government responsibility for promoting prosperity in 
all parts of the UK and for narrowing the gaps across the country 
 
Regional policy and devolution are different things.  In England, central government should 
not abdicate responsibility for regional development or expect this responsibility to be 
devolved in its entirety to local players.  It should instead work closely with regional and local 
players to deliver national goals. 
 
In practice, however, the responsibility for national, regional and local development is 
presently fragmented across UK government departments, notably the Departments for 
Business and for Communities but also the Treasury.  The devolved administrations have 
important roles in their areas of responsibility but there is presently no formal role at the UK 
scale for local authorities, the business community or trade unions.  To introduce much-
needed coherence to central government policy-making in regional and local economic 
development, Labour should therefore: 
 
• Establish a high-level Council for Regional Development to oversee and 
coordinate programmes and policies 
 
                                                          
49 See for example C Beatty and S Fothergill (2016) The Uneven Impact of Welfare Reform: the 
financial losses to places and people, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University. 
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The Council would include not only central government departments but also representatives 
of the devolved administrations, local authorities and social and economic partners. 
 
The use of evidence and analysis to inform policy-making on regional and local economic 
development has faltered in recent years.  Instead, there has been an almost ideological 
faith in the benefits of ‘agglomeration’ – the clustering of businesses, particularly but not 
exclusively in cities, where they are supposed to benefit from proximity to each other.  In 
practice, this dominant view has underpinned a policy emphasis on the UK’s big cities and 
downplayed the importance, diversity and history of place.  More and more towns and 
communities are feeling ‘left behind’ as a result.  Increasingly, they are expected to benefit 
primarily from trickle-down from the big cities – which can only work of course if there is a 
city nearby. 
 
The establishment of a new Council for Regional Development would provide the opportunity 
to take a careful, evidence-based look at the claims about agglomeration and trickle-down 
and to develop a more inclusive and broad-based approach to local and regional growth. 
 
 
 
The devolved administrations 
 
 
Arrangements to support regional economic development differ across the four nations of 
the UK.  Regional policy and industrial strategy are, to a significant extent, competences that 
are now devolved and a Labour government in Westminster would therefore have limited 
powers to intervene in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 
The devolved nations have institutional arrangements for economic development that build 
on structures in place prior to devolution but which have evolved.  Alongside greater 
devolved oversight there has been an increasing focus on nation-wide policies rather than 
on regional or sub-national initiatives. 
 
In Scotland, the principal economic development agencies are accountable to the Scottish 
Government and Parliament and work within the framework of a national economic 
development strategy.  Engagement with local authorities and other stakeholders is provided 
through various networks and local/community planning bodies.   Since 2011 the SNP 
government has refocused the activities of Scottish Enterprise much more on sector growth 
although most Scottish local authorities retain a role in local economic development. 
 
In Wales, the Welsh Government has established a national framework for economic 
development with a strong focus on inclusive growth.  The current plan is to bring a stronger 
place-based approach to economic development based on three broad regions (North 
Wales, Mid and South West Wales, and South East Wales).  The plan covers sectoral, 
environmental and skills policies.  There is also support for a national Development Bank for 
Wales. 
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In Northern Ireland economic strategy differs from the approaches taken in Scotland and 
Wales in that whilst it is focused on growth it seeks to use a tighter set of instruments to 
achieve this, with a strong focus on a core of highly skilled jobs in technologically advanced 
export sectors.  The Northern Ireland Executive has also sought new powers, and in 
particular powers to lower the rate of Corporation Tax, which is seen as essential in 
competing for investment against the Republic of Ireland. 
 
In many respects, the approaches to regional and local development in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland mirror the strategies common in smaller EU states.  They place a strong 
emphasis on cross-sector partnership, long term, multi-annual planning and funding, and on 
smart, inclusive and sustainable growth.  Labour should: 
 
• Welcome the important and independent role that the devolved administrations 
play in regional and local development, and ensure that supportive policies are 
in place at the UK level 
 
 
 
Local Enterprise Partnerships 
 
 
In England the present government’s policy agenda has moved in a different direction. 
 
The direction of travel was first laid out in the 2010 Local Growth White Paper50.  The 
aspiration of the Conservative-led coalition was to rebalance the UK economy away from a 
perceived over-reliance on financial services and on public sector employment.  The 
Regional Development Agencies in England were abolished and replaced by Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). 
 
The geographical coverage of each of the LEPs was left up to local partners to determine, 
subject to sign-off by central government.  A total of 39 LEPs emerged, now reduced to 38 
by a merger.  Smaller than the RDAs they replaced, many of the LEPs cover ‘city regions’ or 
‘functional economic areas’, but there are also points of overlap – 29 local authorities, mainly 
district councils but also some unitary authorities, presently sit in two LEP areas. 
 
LEPs are in theory private sector led institutions, chaired by a local business person. 
Funding for their core functions was initially intended to come from local authorities though 
government funding was eventually made available as local authorities in most cases were 
unable to commit significant resources given the funding cuts they faced.  LEPs are intended 
to be the main bodies coordinating, though rarely delivering, local and regional economic 
development.  From 2014 onwards each LEP was given an allocation from the EU Structural 
Funds and, also from 2014, from the government’s Local Growth Fund, mainly towards the 
cost of infrastructure projects. 
 
                                                          
50 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2010) Local Growth: realising every place’s 
potential, BIS, London. 
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More recently, the 2017 White Paper on Industrial Strategy gave LEPs a central role in 
developing Local Industrial Strategies, either in collaboration with Mayoral Combined 
Authorities or, elsewhere in England, as the lead body. 
 
After a slow start, LEPs have therefore become an important part of the institutional 
architecture of regional and local development in England and one that a Labour 
government will inherit.  That said, LEPs still vary widely in operational capability and in the 
extent to which they are embedded in local decision-making structures.  In July 2018 the 
government announced plans aimed at strengthening LEPs’ capabilities and performance, 
including a review of boundaries intended to remove overlaps51 
 
There are two alternative approaches a Labour government might wish to take in improving 
the effectiveness and accountability of LEPs: 
 
• An 'incremental' approach that builds on existing structures and makes modest 
changes to the relationship between LEPs and local stakeholders. 
 
• A 'transformative’ approach that establishes a full coverage of strategic authorities 
across England to which LEPs would be directly accountable. 
 
An incremental approach would see LEPs retained in their current form but would revise 
their governance to better engage social partners on LEP boards, including trade unions, 
health trusts, educational institutions and the voluntary and community sector as well as 
local authorities.  Whilst individuals from the private sector have given freely of their time and 
made valuable contributions in many LEP areas there is a concern that the interests they 
represent can be too narrow and result in poor decision making.  In particular, the 
prominence of the local property sector in the affairs of some LEPs can mean that economic 
development in some parts of England has become focussed on a narrow set of activities 
around land assembly and development.  The inclusion of social partners would address 
concerns expressed by the TUC52 and would bring in a broader range of expertise. 
 
Under an incremental approach, Local Industrial Strategies would continue to be led by 
LEPs where combined authorities are not in place.  Assuming the current review of LEP 
boundaries results in acceptable revisions the boundary issue would not need to be 
revisited, though this would remain an option. 
 
A transformative approach would involve completing the devolution project by ensuring 
that combined authorities or equivalent structures cover the whole of England.  This would 
guarantee that all areas have an institution able to assume devolved funding, powers and 
responsibilities with the democratic accountability and institutional capacity that LEPs 
currently lack.  The new institutions would most commonly be a formal collaboration of local 
authorities across an area.  It might be a combined authority, an elected assembly, a unitary 
county council or a county/district partnership. 
 
                                                          
51 Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government (2018) Strengthened Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, MHCLG, London. 
52 TUC (2017) Great jobs in great places, TUC, London. 
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Within this transformative framework, LEPs then would be brought under the appropriate 
strategic authority to ensure that their primary functions around economic development are 
aligned with the strategic authority's wider goals.  This would formalise current arrangements 
where LEPs are already heavily reliant on constituent local authorities for staffing and 
expertise53.  Once areas established strategic authorities they would assume full 
responsibility for developing Local Industrial Strategies. 
 
A transformative approach of this kind would probably require primary legislation and would 
need to be aligned with any wider plans for local government in England.  It would however 
create a stronger basis for economic development in the regions. 
 
Labour needs to weigh up the merits of these different approaches to the future of LEPs, 
which clearly interact with policymaking on the future of English local government.  Whatever 
the approach, however, Labour should aim to: 
 
• Retain Local Enterprise Partnerships but be prepared to modify their 
structures and raise their effectiveness 
 
• Make LEPs more clearly and directly accountable to the local authorities within 
their areas, including combined authorities in the places where these have 
been established 
 
• Engage a range of social partners on LEP boards to improve accountability 
and bring to bear their expertise 
 
 
 
Devolution in England 
 
 
In England, local and regional economic development has been further complicated by the 
uneven pace of devolution.  There have been a number of City Deals covering funding in 
areas such as social care, skills development and transport.  More recently, additional 
funding under Devolution Deals has been linked to the establishment of combined 
authorities with elected mayors. 
 
Conservative ministers have been keen to argue that the devolution of funding to local 
authorities, especially at the city-region level, will lead to faster growth and more jobs.  Local 
authorities, which have just about all faced huge cuts in mainstream funding, have generally 
accepted this argument in order to claw back at least some monies and taken the view that 
they can do a better job than Whitehall. 
 
In practice, if the money is not ‘new’ but merely a transfer from an existing central 
government budget line – which is the case with City Deals, for example, and also applies to 
the Local Growth Fund – the real economic benefits of devolution are likely to be marginal.  
                                                          
53 See National Audit Office (2016) Local Enteprise Partnerships. NAO: London. 
47 
 
Local control enables greater sensitivity to local circumstances but not necessarily a great 
deal more.  The Devolution Deals resulting in the establishment of combined authorities with 
elected mayors do appear to be backed by new money but in all cases the scale of the new 
money falls far short of what has already been withdrawn by cuts in mainstream funding. 
 
This deal-based approach to devolution in England has actually hampered a more wide-
ranging review of the powers of local government, which are limited compared to countries 
such as the United States or Germany where there are higher levels of fiscal 
decentralisation. The instruments at the disposal of English local authorities, for example to 
issue bonds or secure loans, remain extremely limited, something that has impacted 
particularly badly on the ability to build affordable housing.  Indeed, the Conservative-led 
governments since 2010 have never commissioned a systematic evaluation of the economic 
benefits of the devolved arrangements they have introduced. 
 
A serious flaw in the present deal-based approach to devolution is that it has been offered to 
only a minority of authorities covering only around a third of the English population.  Indeed, 
the model appears to work best where there are established city-regions with a history of 
collaboration.  Furthermore, areas without combined authorities and elected mayors may 
now find it difficult to secure new funding or powers.  The earmarking of half the 
Transforming Cities Fund for six combined authorities with elected mayors, leaving the rest 
of England to submit bids for shares of a diminished pot, is a case in point54. 
 
In operating a deal-based approach the Conservative government has claimed that it is 
responding to the variable capacity of areas to assume devolved powers and funding.  This 
masks what in effect has become a system of ministerial patronage.  It is probably 
incumbent on Labour to honour the existing Devolution Deals where local authority partners 
wish them to remain in place but, looking ahead, a better approach would be for Labour to: 
 
• Discontinue the current deal-based approach to devolution to English local 
authorities in favour of more straightforward centre-local funding models 
based on the assessment of need 
 
A common view is that devolution to London and Greater Manchester has been welcome 
and successful because of long-standing working relationships across borough boundaries.  
For similar reasons, devolution to a number of other areas with strong city-regions, such as 
Birmingham, Liverpool and Tees Valley looks likely to take root. 
 
However, where local areas are more polycentric, with multiple and often rival urban centres, 
it is harder for the current Conservative model to apply.  Moreover, some of the UK’s 
strongest local economies with growing pressures on housing and infrastructure (in parts of 
the South) and many of the most peripheral areas in need of growth (seaside towns for 
example) are hard to shoe-horn into city-region frameworks and, indeed, have been left 
largely untouched to date by devolution plans.  These areas would benefit from a more  
straightforward centre-local funding model and a more consistent application of devolution to 
combined authorities or equivalent structures. 
 
                                                          
54 Autumn Budget 2017, HM Treasury, London. 
48 
 
DEVOLVED ARRANGEMENTS IN ENGLAND (as at spring 2018) 
 
  
GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS
Business, Energy 
and Industrial 
Strategy
(Industrial Strategy, 
State Aid, Assisted 
Areas)
Housing, 
Communities and 
Local Government
(Enterprise Zones, 
LEPs, City Deals, 
Local Growth Fund, 
Devolution Deals and 
EU funds)
Cabinet Office
(Public procurement)
HM Treasury 
(Taxation, spending)
CO-ORDINATING 
STRUCTURES 
Cabinet Committee 
on the Economy 
and Industrial 
Strategy 
SUB-NATIONAL 
STRUCTURES 
Local authorities
Local planning
Service delivery
Business rates
LEPs
Funding (direct or 
to allocate): Local 
Growth Fund and EU 
Funds
Combined 
Authorities 
Mayoral CAs: 
Greater Manchester, 
Liverpool City 
Region, Tees Valley, 
West Midlands, West 
of England, 
Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough
Without mayor: 
Sheffield City Region, 
West Yorkshire, 
North East
City Deals 
26 deals agreed with 
LAs/LEPs with more 
under negotiation. 
Eight central 
government 
departments have a  
role in implementing 
the deals by 
providing  funding or 
support. 
Local Industrial 
Strategies 
Led by mayoral 
Combined Authorities 
or by LEPs where is 
a combined authority 
without a mayor or no 
combined authority at 
all. First LISs to be 
agreed by March 
2019.
Devolution Deals 
7 agreed (Cornwall, 
Tees Valley, 
Liverpool City 
Region, West of 
England, West 
Midlands, Greater 
Manchester, 
Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough)
Withdrawn or yet to 
be ratified: West 
Yorkshire, Sheffield 
City Region, North 
East, East Anglia, 
Greater Lincolnshire.
Cities and Local Growth Unit 
Negotiates and co-ordinates City Deals, Local Growth Fund and 
Devolution Deals
SUB-NATIONAL 
DEALS AND 
PLANNED 
DEVELOPMENTS
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Regions 
 
 
In England at present, there is an institutional vacuum between Local Enterprise 
Partnerships at the city-region level and central government in London.  This makes it 
difficult to knit together funding streams that operate at different geographical scales and to 
integrate the policies and priorities of neighbouring LEPs.  It raises the possibility of wasteful 
duplication and overlap where LEPs pursue similar but not always compatible agendas.  And 
it runs the risk of detaching central government too far from problems and opportunities on 
the ground. 
 
Indeed, with just eight Regional Development Agencies outside London a regular criticism 
used to be that they too often pursued the same ‘industrial cluster’ strategies.  With 38 
separate LEPs (give or take a few following the present review of boundaries) the problem is 
multiplied.  Not everywhere can expect to be a world-leading hub of biotechnology or 
artificial intelligence, or whatever else may be the most glamorous sector of the moment.  
Better to recognise that public investment needs to build on each area’s distinctive strengths.  
 
Labour needs to be cautious about creating new structures, but it also needs to recognise 
that the Conservative cull of regional institutions in the early 2010s was rooted in antipathy 
towards regional governance rather than an assessment of need.  Labour should: 
 
• Re-establish government offices in the English regions to help co-ordinate the 
work of the LEPs and strengthen central-local relations 
 
In particular, government offices in the English regions need to take a cross-regional 
perspective and deliver coordination between regional or local interventions, on the one 
hand, and wider policy areas such as education, skills, transport, housing and national 
infrastructure provision. 
 
The Conservative government’s Northern Powerhouse provides belated recognition, 
perhaps, that local economies do operate across LEP boundaries.  But the Northern 
Powerhouse itself has never been properly defined – is it just Manchester, or Manchester 
plus Leeds and a couple of other cities, or the whole of northern England?  Actions and 
spending plans point to just the big cities, but this is something Conservative minister deny. 
 
More recently, the Northern Powerhouse initiative has become entangled with devolution to 
combined authorities with elected mayors.  It has also become a convenient label to be 
applied to infrastructure investments in the North that would probably have happened 
anyway.  And to deflect criticism that the North is getting special treatment, the Conservative 
government subsequently established a Midlands Engine. 
 
Increasingly, the Northern Powerhouse and Midlands Engine look at best to be window-
dressing and at worst a framework to encourage local authority compliance with a 
Conservative agenda on local governance.  Labour should: 
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• Replace the present Northern Powerhouse and Midlands Engine with cross-
boundary frameworks for collaboration between central and local government 
 
Collaboration is likely to work best on issues such as investments in transport that span 
regional and LEP boundaries. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In government, Labour has the chance to make a big difference to Britain’s fractured 
economy and to narrow the differences in prosperity between regions and local areas across 
the country.  In doing so it can restore hope to communities that presently feel left behind 
and ease the pressure on the most congested parts of London and the South East where 
the growth of the economy and population is outstripping the ability of infrastructure and the 
housing market to cope.  A better distribution of economic activity can be of benefit to the 
whole country. 
 
That said, Labour should not expect rapid change overnight.  Reversing the polarisation that 
has taken decades to develop is a task that needs to be sustained for years across more 
than one parliament.  But there should never be any doubt that change is possible.  Indeed, 
the long history of UK regional policy shows that in the absence of substantial regeneration 
efforts over the years the economies in much of the North, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland would be in a far, far worse state than at present.  Regional and local economic 
development policies do work – they just take time. 
 
Nevertheless, such a major overhaul of Britain’s regional and local geography will not be 
brought about merely by lofty aspirations and intentions.  What a Labour government needs 
is a suite of policies that it can begin to introduce early in its first term.  Existing 
commitments, in the 2017 election manifesto, are a good starting point.  The proposals here, 
in this report, add important practical detail. 
  
52 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
List of maps and tables (in order referenced in the text) 
 
 
Figure 1: ILO unemployment by district, June 2017 
Figure 2: Estimated real unemployment by district, Spring 2017 
Table 1: Output and employment by LEP area and sub-region 
Figure 3: Share of jobs in managerial and professional occupations, by district, 2017 
Figure 4: Gross weekly earnings of full-time workers, by district, 2014-16 
Figure 5: Employment in all manufacturing, by district, 2016 
Figure 6: Employment in food and drink production, by district, 2016 
Figure 7: Employment in chemicals production, by district, 2016 
Figure 8: Employment in pharmaceuticals production, by district 2016 
Figure 9: Employment in the iron and steel industry, by district, 2016 
Figure 10: Employment in motor vehicles production, by district, 2016 
Figure 11: Employment in the aerospace industry, by district, 2016 
Figure 12: Employment in R&D establishments, by district, 2016 
  
53 
 
Figure 1: ILO unemployment by district, June 2017 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey  
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Figure 2: Estimated real unemployment by district, Spring 2017 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on ONS and DWP data  
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Table 1: Output and employment by LEP area and sub-region 
  
GVA per head 
2016 
UK=100 
Increase in 
GVA* 
2010-16 
% 
Increase in 
employment 
2010-16 
% 
London 169.4 19.9 18.3 
Thames Valley Berkshire 150.8 10.1 9.8 
Oxfordshire 124.5 19.0 12.7 
Enterprise M3 121.4 11.4 6.2 
Cheshire & Warrington 116.2 11.8 13.3 
Hertfordshire 115.0 15.1 17.4 
Buckinghamshire Thames Valley 111.3 14.3 9.6 
West of England 109.2 10.7 5.4 
South East Midlands 108.1 16.2 14.5 
Coventry & Warwickshire 105.0 28.4 11.2 
Greater Cambridge & Gr. Peterborough 102.4 13.9 12.3 
Solent 98.9 7.1 4.4 
Gloucestershire 97.5 12.1 3.6 
Swindon & Wiltshire 95.0 8.5 9.8 
Cumbria 91.9 11.7 4.9 
Coast to Capital 90.7 8.7 6.8 
Greater Birmingham & Solihull 85.1 16.2 11.8 
Leicester & Leicestershire 85.1 10.1 9.3 
Greater Manchester 85.0 9.2 8.4 
Worcestershire 83.9 22.1 7.8 
Dorset 82.7 11.0 7.1 
New Anglia 82.0 9.4 7.5 
York, North Yorkshire & East Riding 81.8 5.2 5.4 
Leeds City Region 80.8 9.5 6.0 
Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham & Notts 80.0 13.2 6.4 
South East 79.8 10.7 7.7 
Lancashire 79.8 11.6 3.9 
The Marches 78.4 9.5 4.0 
Humber 78.3 4.6 2.9 
Heart of the South West 78.3 9.5 2.4 
Greater Lincolnshire 74.7 5.9 3.2 
Liverpool City Region 74.5 1.2 4.5 
North East 73.9 9.7 3.1 
Stoke on Trent & Staffordshire 73.7 10.2 7.6 
Tees Valley 72.2 0.7 - 0.7 
Sheffield City Region 71.3 12.3 5.6 
Cornwall & Isles of Scilly 68.6 11.5 3.1 
Black Country 66.1 7.2 - 0.7 
    
(continued….)    
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Table 1 (continued) 
  
GVA per head 
2016 
UK=100 
Increase in 
GVA* 
2010-16 
% 
Increase in 
employment 
2010-16 
% 
Aberdeen & Aberdeenshire 134.6 7.8 5.4 
Edinburgh City Region 95.6 9.9 9.2 
Glasgow City Region 90.8 11.3 6.1 
Highlands & Islands 87.8 11.6 5.4 
Dundee-Perth City Region 86.8 11.7 2.5 
South West Scotland 70.2 8.4 3.4 
    
South East Wales 77.1 12.1 4.7 
North Wales 77.1 14.1 8.1 
South West Wales 66.4 12.7 4.2 
    
Northern Ireland 76.9 10.3 n.a. 
    
United Kingdom (GB) 100.0 12.1 (8.5) 
    
 
*Adjusted for inflation 
 
Sources: ONS, Business Register and Employment Survey 
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Figure 3: Share of jobs in managerial and professional occupations, by district, 2017 
 
 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey 
  
58 
 
Figure 4: Gross weekly earnings of full-time workers, by district, 2014-16 
 
 
Source: ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
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Figure 5: Employment in all manufacturing, by district, 2016 
 
Source: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey  
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Figure 6: Employment in food and drink production, by district, 2016 
 
 
Source: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey  
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Figure 7: Employment in chemicals production, by district, 2016 
 
 
Source: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey  
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Figure 8: Employment in pharmaceuticals production, by district, 2016 
 
 
Source: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey  
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Figure 9: Employment in the iron and steel industry, by district, 2016 
 
 
Source: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey  
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Figure 10: Employment in motor vehicles production, by district, 2016 
 
 
Source: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey  
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Figure 11: Employment in the aerospace industry, by district, 2016 
 
 
Source: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey  
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Figure 12: Employment in R&D establishments, by district, 2016 
 
Source: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey 
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